In
modern Muslim theology, few are seen as more radical and violent than Ayman
al-Zawahiri. The current leader of terrorist group al-Qaeda, Zawahiri spent
years arguing against secular or puppet governments of predominantly Muslim
states, before he and Osama bin Laden switched to directly attacking
non-Muslims, both in and out of the Arab world. Medieval Muslim theologian
Averroes (ibn Rushd) created much of the backing for modern views of jihad,
although he was considered peaceful in his time. Similarly, twentieth century
Muslim writer Mahmud Shaltut argued against a violent interpretation of the
Quran, though his writings are much more pacifist than those of Averroes,
largely due to a difference in the times in which they lived. In his legal
handbook Bidayat al-Mujtahid Wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid, Averroes explains that a
main point of disagreement among scholars of his time exists on whether jihad
is meant to be offensive or defensive—offensive meaning that eligible Muslims
are obligated to fight non-Muslims purely due to their difference in religion,
and defensive meaning that Muslims should only fight when provoked. While
Averroes does not take a clear stance on the matter, the disparity exists in
recent Muslim writings as well, and this is highlighted as Shaltut interprets
jihad as purely defensive and Zawahiri believes it to be offensive. Because of
this difference, Averroes would often be able to reconcile Zawahiri’s
interpretations with his own whereas Shaltut would blatantly disagree with
Zawahiri’s concept of jihad.
While
Zawahiri defends his calls for violence by describing the current situation of
Islam as a time of war, Shaltut and Averroes would both have a difficult time
believing that the modern world calls for measures as extreme as those he uses.
In his 2002 essay “Why Attack America,” Zawahiri writes that because the US,
Europe, and Russia are actively allying against Islam, young Muslims have come
to understand that “there is no solution without jihad” (Why Attack America,
132). Zawahiri is able to use this to justify many of his claims on necessary action
against the west by claiming that Muslims were provoked, forcing them to stand
up against a united enemy. If we can accept Zawahiri’s backing, then Averroes’
claim that "the Muslims agree that in times of war, all adult,
able-bodied, unbelieving males may be slain" (Averroes, 33) may serve to
support Zawahiri’s call. This quote is not as universally applicable as it may
seem because of the ambiguity of the phrase “in times of war,” however Zawahiri
claims that the situation of the west leaves Muslims no alternative. In
addition, Shaltut explains that “unbelievers” are only those who directly
oppose Islam (Shaltut, 78). If this is the case, it is hard to tell whether or
not all of Zawahiri’s claimed enemy can be accepted as direct threats to Islam
and therefore worthy of killing. Averroes himself would likely disagree with
the notion that every resident of the USA, Europe, and Russia is in direct
conflict with Islam, but the argument can be made that by living under and
accepting such a government, people in these regions deserve to be slain at the hands of al-Qaeda.
Shaltut takes a more definitive stance on the issue by writing that fighting
must be defensive, for Allah hates aggression (Shaltut, 74). Like that of
Averroes, Shaltut’s philosophy is compatible with Zawahiri’s if we accept
Zawahiri’s justification for his call to action. However, this notion becomes
harder to defend in light of Shaltut’s claim immediately afterwards that
Muslims may harm their enemies only to the extent that their enemies harm them.
In this light, Shaltut may caution Zawahiri to clarify his call to action in
order to avoid attacking too strongly and thereby become the aggressor.
However, on discussing Muslim fundamentalists in Egypt, Zawahiri writes that
“the Islamic movement has been on the offensive against the enemies of Islam”
(On the Islamist Revolution in Egypt, 70). Here Zawahiri refers specifically to
a group of young Muslim rebels in Egypt, but from his support of their attacks
it can be taken that he supports the Islamic movement as offensive and that its
actions are not solely in response to specific provocations by the “enemy.”
Because of this Zawahiri would lose Shaltut’s support, and various scholars
cited by Averroes would disagree as he expands his definition of “times of war”
beyond times when Muslims are forced to defend themselves. While Averroes and
Shaltut would applaud Zawahiri’s call for defensive jihad, they would likely
also call him to revise his concept of desperate times for the Muslim world.
While
Zawahiri sees his attacks a preventative and therefore necessary, Averroes and
Shaltut would call for him to be more careful in targeting the specific enemy
that he finds abhorrent. Zawahiri justifies his call to action against the
United States specifically by explaining attacks as a preventative measure—if
Muslims do not attack the US soon, the US will attack Muslims instead (Why
Attack America, 133). Similarly, in defending the rebellious Egyptian youth,
Zawahiri explains that working for reform through legal channels had been
ineffective and therefore more violent measures were necessary (On the Islamist
Revolution in Egypt, 70). Here again, Shaltut would discourage all actions
against a non-Muslim enemy that were not directly provoked and therefore would
likely disagree with Zawahiri’s logic. When asked about his killing of innocent
people in the name of jihad, Zawahiri claims that this has been unintentional
error or out of necessity—sometimes innocent people have to be killed in order
to devastate the enemy effectively. Averroes might take some issue with this,
as he is very clear that those allowed to be killed in times of war are
informed, able-bodied, adult, unbelieving males. For a variety of subjects
including women, children, monks, disabled people, and the elderly, Averroes
states that killing is much less agreed upon among scholars of his time
(Averroes, 33-35). This controversy, he writes, hits at the core question of
whether jihad is defensive or offensive, and while Averroes does not state an
opinion on this disagreement he cites a variety of authors who oppose the
killing of anyone other than able-bodied men. Regardless of their opinions on
his reasoning for attacks, Averroes and Shaltut would both disagree with
Zawahiri’s means.
However,
Zawahiri does create a strong set of justifications for his detestation for the
west in a variety of his works. In Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, Zawahiri
proclaims that the West and Russia have joined against Islam and make it clear
through proclamations against Muslim fundamentalists, creation of organizations
such as the United Nations, support of multinational corporations, and use of
international news channels (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 193). All of
these, he writes, are tools used by the rest of the world against Islam. This
argument echoes his essay Why Attack America in his claims that various
international institutions directly threaten the Muslim world (Why Attack
America, 131). If this can be considered persecution of Muslims, Shaltut may
respond in saying that those who persecute without killing must be treated just
as harshly as those who kill (Shaltut, 74-75). However, Shaltut ultimately
argues that the Quran aims to create and maintain peace, an argument which will
be explained further throughout this essay. Because of this, he would likely
find it difficult to believe that the creation of international organizations
and systems is a threat to Islam unless they were used in direct and violent
attacks on Muslim lands. As Zawahiri does not give much reasoning as to why
these institutions come into conflict with Islam, it is difficult to say
whether or not Muslim scholars would find his argument justified. In Loyalty
and Separation, Zawahiri accuses Americans and Jews of mixing truth with lies
and allies with enemies so as to confuse Muslims (The Writings of Ayman
al-Zawahiri, 206). He exhorts Muslims to “understand the extent of the
treachery of the enemies of Islam” so as to fight them more effectively.
Shaltut may agree with this to a certain extent as he writes that early Muslims
did not wait to be attacked but instead worked to keep hostile powers under
control when they encountered them (Shaltut, 100). However, Shaltut’s concept
of a hostile power differs significantly from Zawahiri’s, and Shaltut suggests
verbal negotiation rather than violence as a means of addressing enemies.
Averroes might also suggest negotiations, although his interpretation of a
treaty might be unpopular in modern international relations. His requirements
for compromise will be discussed further within this essay. Shaltut and
Averroes would warn Zawahiri against being so quick to resort to violence where
diplomacy and negotiation are possible.
Zawahiri
defends his tendency towards violence by warning the west about the
consequences of their actions. In an introduction to Zawahiri’s life and work,
Stéphane Lacroix writes that after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Zawahiri
began producing videos to reprimand the United States for entering Iraq and
warn the US that its actions may provoke future attacks (The Writings of Ayman
al-Zawahiri, 161). While al-Qaeda did little to warn the west before 2001, and
what little they did received minimal attention, the post-2001 warning videos
do provide some grounds for Zawahiri to claim that the west has now been
informed and warned. This is crucial, as Averroes writes that an enemy must
have been instructed to join Islam, and explains that the Quran actually gives
many steps to take before attacking, an enemy including multiple conversion
attempts and jizya, or tax on non-Muslims (Averroes, 37). While it would
certainly be an exaggeration to claim that Zawahiri has tried to convert
westerners and there is no record of al-Qaeda attempting to impose any kind of
tax, Zawahiri has made some attempt to alert westerners of their own ignorance
and the insult they have caused to Islam. However, this conversion process is a
point on which Shaltut disagrees with Averroes, as Shaltut claims that forced
conversion would insult Islam and that Allah intentionally chose a nonviolent
prophet to spread Islam through miracles and kindness (Shaltut, 67). In Knights
Under the Prophet’s Banner, Zawahiri explains that the growing Islamic
Coalition aims to strike fear in the US, Russia, and Israel (The Writings of
Ayman al-Zawahiri, 194). Neither Averroes nor Shaltut gives backing for
intimidating the enemy, however this can also be seen as a means of warning the
west and Zawahiri might argue that it is the only kind of warning that is
effective in the minds of self-interested westerners. While the two might
applaud Zawahiri’s efforts, they would likely agree that his attempts at
warning the west were not significant enough to merit a resort to violence.
Throughout
time Zawahiri has changed his opinion on violence within Arab countries, but
his initial calls against non-Muslims in the Muslim world would fit a very
different set of Quranic standards from his current attacks. In Knights under
the Prophet’s Banner, Zawahiri writes that if caught in a battle they do not
choose, the movement must attack Americans and Jews in the Arab world (The
Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 202). To this, Averroes might again remind
Zawahiri that Muslims must attempt to convert an enemy before attacking, and
that a poll tax for unbelievers can be instituted to avoid resorting to
violence, as explained in the previous paragraph. However, Averroes also notes
that Mohammed himself performed multiple surprise attacks and most scholars go
by Mohammed's deeds rather than his words (Averroes, 38). Shaltut writes that
the aim of war is to stop all religious persecution (Shaltut, 77), so while
Zawahiri stipulates that his claim comes in the event that Muslims are caught
in a society of non-Muslims who persecute them, his instructions could easily
be taken too far and turn into religious persecution by Muslims of minority
religion in Arab lands. However, his specific wording in this section, based on
the assumption that Muslims are forced into a battle not of their choosing,
would likely be acceptable to both Averroes and Shaltut. While Averroes and
Shaltut would likely accept Zawahiri’s call to attack non-Muslim Arabs when
forced into war, they would caution him to note when violence is forced or when
it is simply provoked.
Zawahiri
writes quite a bit of violent advice to the everyday Muslim, with which
Averroes in particular would disagree. In the second half of Knights under the
Prophet’s Banner, Zawahiri writes that small groups can easily spread terror
among Americans and Jews, and proceeds to give suggestions on ways to create
violence even without extensive resources (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri,
198). Among his suggestions, he writes that Muslims should inflict maximum
casualties on the enemy and minimum Muslim casualties. Again, Averroes might
point out that there is significant controversy on killing anyone who is not an
able adult male (Averroes, 33-35), and Shaltut may remind him that Muslims
should only fight to the extent that they are attacked (Shaltut, 74). However, Averroes
also brings up interesting arguments in addressing mass killings that do not
apply to individual violence. He writes that some scholars forbid killing with
fire because that is reserved for Allah’s use in Hell (Averroes, 36), an
argument that significantly weakens Zawahiri’s advice on mass casualties that
include explosions. In addition, Zawahiri suggests that mujahidins find parts
of the Western world that are especially vulnerable, such as government
buildings (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 204). On this specifically
Averroes cites scholars who argue against damage to property such as buildings
(Averroes, 37), however he gives a variety of opinions on the matter and many
of his Muslim contemporaries took no issue with destruction of buildings, so
Zawahiri’s instructions could be justified. When asked why al-Qaeda has not put
more effort into attacking Israel directly, Zawahiri responds that the
destruction of Israel is not a priority over the destruction of any other state
that is rightfully Muslim, and says to the questioner that he might as well ask
why Palestinian Muslims haven't attacked evil in places such as Chechnya or
Afghanistan (The Open Meeting, 4). This may seem surprising in light of
Zawahiri’s strong anti-Semitism, however in this response he brings up the idea
that the Muslim world and rightfully-Muslim territories and no one is more or
less significant than another. Averroes may appreciate this response in that
he, too, writes that jihad is collective rather than personal (Averroes, 29) so
Muslims as a community should support Muslim states around the world and not
just focus on Palestine. Averroes would find Zawahiri’s advice neither well
intentioned nor well thought-out, and would suggest that he revise both his
motives and his means before suggesting methods of violence to a large group of
followers.
Zawahiri
is particularly critical of Arab governments in their current willingness to
work with the rest of the world. Lacroix writes that after Sadat signed a peace
treaty with Israel, Islamic groups were sure to assassinate him (The Writings
of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 151). To frustrated Muslims, this was just another
example of the Egyptian puppet government consenting to western pleas for
compromise. To back this and similar accusations, Zawahiri criticizes Arab
rulers who ally themselves with unbelievers in saying that alliance between
Muslims and unbelievers poses a great threat to the sanctity of the Muslim
world (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 225). However, Averroes points out
that the Quran makes specific provisions for truces with nonbelievers (The
Legal Doctrine of Jihad, 38-40). He writes that in a truce, the enemies must
pay money to the Muslims and that truces may only last for a limited number of
years: the [debated] number when Mohammed made a truce with Hudaybiyya. While
Sadat’s treaty did not fit these requirements, Averroes would also disagree
with Zawahiri’s assertion that any declaration of peace between Muslims and
non-Muslims is cause to rebel against, or even kill, the peacemakers. Zawahiri
also criticizes many Arab states for agreeing to help protect Israel against
the attacks of Mujahidins (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 227). It is clear
why al-Zawahiri, a champion of jihad, would disagree with these protections,
but Shaltut might disagree with his continual criticism of institutionalized
peace and international agreements. Shaltut tells his audience that the
ultimate aim of the Quran is happiness of the individual and of the community
(Shaltut, 82), a concept with which Zawahiri would likely disagree but which
should be noted because it is a main point in the discrepancy between Shaltut’s
and Zawahiri’s interpretations of Islam and specifically of the Quran. Zawahiri
is particularly critical of the United Nations, calling it an enemy of Islam
(The Open Meeting, 5) and saying that “its ability to judge is based on the
refusal of revealed law and docile submission to the will of the world’s top
five criminals” (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 226), those criminals being
the permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. Zawahiri’s distaste for
the UN is particularly interesting in that Shaltut writes that Mohammed
championed international peace centuries before the creation of the UN or
League of Nations (Shaltut, 71-72) and asserts that these organizations were
slow to show up and do a mediocre job of keeping the peace that Mohammed called
for, which comes in direct contrast to Zawahiri’s ideas of the United Nations.
While Shaltut would be much more supportive of the current state of many Arab
governments than would Averroes, both would find Zawahiri’s response to be more
than a justified amount of rebellion.
Zawahiri
is particularly harsh with non-Muslims living in Muslim lands. Lacroix explains
that before 1998, al-Qaeda aimed to attack secular Arab governments and
non-Muslims in Arab countries (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 158), and
while that is no longer al-Qaeda’s aim, Zawahiri makes it clear that friendship
with unbelievers is evil and Muslims who befriend others can be guilty of their
sins by association (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 171). Shaltut would
take issue with this because he writes that the Quran actually supports extreme
kindness to non-Muslims and he prides Islam on its “lofty spirit of
righteousness, cooperation, equity, and affinity…with regard to its relations
with non-Muslims” (Shaltut, 80). Averroes might claim that both of his
successors are naïve and treatment of non-Muslims should be more nuanced than
they make it. He calls for fighting of all polytheists (Averroes, 30), which
may seem to have minimal modern relevance as most of the modern enemies of
al-Qaeda are not adherents of polytheistic religions but Averroes often
includes people of the book in his use of the term. However, he lists Quraysh
and Arab Christians as an exception to those who must pay the jizya, and says
there is controversy on Zoroastrians (Averroes, 40). Averroes also tends to prescribe
taxing rather than violence towards non-Muslims, though Zawahiri may be able to
justify his violence as a necessary step in a world where taxing of all
non-Muslims is highly impractical. In explaining the Quranic verse calling
Muslims to "fight the unbelievers that are near to you" Shaltut
explains that this should be interpreted to mean that if you are already
fighting many unbelievers, the near enemy ought to be a priority over the far
(Shaltut, 40) and reminds the reader that an “unbeliever” is only one who
directly opposes Islam. They would both likely take issue with Zawahiri’s
comment that Muslims must push all others out of Muslim lands (The Writings of
Ayman al-Zawahiri, 223) especially as there are many non-Arab territories that
Zawahiri claims to be rightfully Muslim lands, including Chechnya, Ceuta,
Kashmir, and East Timor. Because Shaltut claims that jihad exists to prevent
religious persecution (Shaltut, 77), he would strongly disagree with Zawahiri’s
call to persecute non-Muslims in these territories. Shaltut would strongly
oppose Zawahiri’s call to violence against non-Muslim Arabs, whereas Averroes
might support it but would remind Zawahiri that violence is not the only means
to his desired end.
Zawahiri
is similarly critical of those he considers to be bad Muslims, often those who
are particularly pacifist, but in this case his criticism does not translate
into violence. Zawahiri considers democracy a religion because legislation
comes from the people when it should come from Allah (The Writings of Ayman
al-Zawahiri, 184), and criticizes many judges and high ranking officials for
not supporting the jihadist movement, saying they have sinned against Islam
(The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 197). However, Shaltut might argue that the
prophet himself promoted negotiation over violence whenever possible (Shaltut,
100) and explain that the Quran exists partially to help communities achieve
happiness on their terms (Shaltut, 84). Because of this, it is entirely
possible that Shaltut would not only find democracy to work with Islam, but he
might argue that they complement each other and have similar goals. On
Zawahiri’s criticism of religious authority, Averroes would likely call him to
respect them and remind him of their Quranic significance, as imams are given
many ultimate decisions during wartimes, especially in regards to treatment of
captives (Averroes, 31).Zawahiri also claims that those who do not participate
in jihad are not true Muslims (The Importance of Afghanistan in the Islamic
Revolution, 48), which turns his attack from those who support a government
with which he disagrees to all Muslims who do not actively fight that
government, which is the specific use of jihad to which he refers in the essay.
Averroes would disagree, as he claims the obligation of jihad, while communal,
does not require all able-bodied men to fight, citing Mohammed’s own insistence
on leaving people to tend to and defend his homelands whenever he went to
battle (Averroes, 29). Shaltut’s perspective on fighting has been made clear,
because even if we accept Zawahiri’s claim that his call to jihad is a
defensive measure taken during wartime, Shaltut repeats the idea that fighting
must come in reaction to an attack and only to the extent that Muslims were attacked
(Shaltut, 74). The two would use similar arguments to dispute most of Bitter
Harvest, in which Zawahiri criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood for not being
aggressive enough (The Writings of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 172) and especially for
not creating international controversy, at which point Zawahiri’s claims that
his attacks are defensive becomes harder to defend. While both earlier authors
would disagree with Zawahiri’s notion of violent jihad as an obligation for all
Muslims, they might applaud him for avoiding using violence against his fellow
Muslim, at least where intentional.
Both
older authors would find Zawahiri’s call to jihad to be too strongly based in
violence, although Averroes would find some of Zawahiri’s violence to be
justified and even Shaltut might find cases such as US involvement in Iraq and
Afghanistan to constitute justified call for some kind of action, though not
necessarily violence. Shaltut would criticize most of al-Qaeda attacks during
the twenty first century because Zawahiri sees jihad as offensive and Shaltut
believes it to be defensive, while Averroes might be more willing to support
those attacks had Zawahiri taken the necessary steps preceding his violence.
The two would certainly criticize Zawahiri for attacks such as those in New
York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001, telling Zawahiri that he had not
effectively tried to convert or impose non-violent action on the American
people, and that he has lost sight of religious violence as a means of humbling
the enemy. While Averroes and Shaltut agree that violence is sometimes
necessary, and to different extents, they would also agree that Zawahiri ought
to be more careful in his choice of when to use violence and when criticism,
negotiation, or even attempts at peaceful conversion would be more appropriate
and even more effective.
Works Cited
al-Zawahiri, Ayman. "On the Islamist
Revolution in Egypt." Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East. Edited
by Barry Rubin. Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Oxford
University Press, January 2002. 69-72.
—. "The Importance of Afghanistan in the
Islamic Revolution." Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East. Edited
by Barry Rubin. Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Oxford
University Press, January 2002. 47-49.
—. "The Open Meeting." The Open
Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri. As-Sahab Foundation for Islamic Media,
2008.
—. "The Writings of Ayman
al-Zawahiri." Al-Qaeda in its own words. Edited by Gilles Kepel,
Jean-Pierre Milelli and Ghazaleh, Pascale. Harvard University Press, April 30,
2008. 147-227.
—. "Why Attack America."
Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East. Edited by Barry Rubin. Oxford
University Press, January 2002. 131-133.
Averroes. "The Legal Doctrine of
Jihad." In Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, by Rudolph Peters, 27-42.
Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005.
Shaltut, Mahmud. "A Modernist
Interpretation of Jihad." In Jihad in Modern and Classical Arabic, by
Rudolph Peters, 59-101. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005.
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